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A CURRENT REVIEW OF CHINESE LAND-USE LAW AND 
POLICY: A “BREAKTHROUGH” IN RURAL REFORM? 
Robin Dean and Tobias Damm-Luhr† 
Abstract: Three decades ago, China moved from a communal system of farming 
to a system that granted more extensive land-use rights to individual households, starting 
rural China on a path to greater prosperity.  Today, however, the law and policy 
promulgated by the Chinese government prevents farmers from fully realizing this 
prosperity.  The Land Administration Law gives farmers thirty-year contractual rights to 
the land they farm and the Law on Rural Land Contracting strengthens this right by more 
specifically enumerating requirements for land contracting and the transfer of contractual 
rights.  Nevertheless, the rural-urban gap is the worst it has been in decades and rural 
Chinese are left behind to watch their urban counterparts enjoy China’s recent economic 
success.  Realizing the need for rural reform, the government has issued two policy 
directives that outline measures to increase land tenure security with the goals of 
doubling farmers’ incomes by 2020 and maintaining the country’s grain supply.  While 
these documents are well intentioned, they are insufficient to fully address rural issues 
surrounding land tenure rights and do not represent a breakthrough in rural land reform.  
In order for the policy directives to be more effective, the Chinese government should 
define who exercises collective ownership rights over farmland, implement a rural 
registration system, and educate farmers concerning that system.  By taking these steps, 
China will better ensure that conditions in its rural areas will begin to match the 
prosperity that was envisioned for them thirty years ago. 
 
 
“You will all have more money in your pockets in the future.” 
 Hu Jintao to the residents of Xiaogang village, September 20081 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, the Chinese government celebrated the thirtieth anniversary 
of the economic reforms that brought China prosperity and growth.2  These 
reforms included the introduction of the Household Responsibility System 
(“HRS”) to the Chinese countryside, which ended collectivized agriculture 
and heralded a return to individual farming.3  China’s increased prosperity, 
however, has been realized mainly in the country’s urban areas, where a 
                                           
† Juris Doctorates expected 2010, The University of Washington School of Law.  The Authors would 
like to thank the editors and staff of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, Professor Dongsheng Zang for 
his guidance, and RDI Staff Attorney Keliang Zhu for his insight. 
1
 Wieland Wagner, China’s Rural Revamp: The Legend of Xiaogang, SPIEGELONLINE, Nov. 7, 
2008, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,589165,00.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2009). 
2
 Land Reform in China: Promises, Promises, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 2008, available at 
http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12437707#top.  
3
 Keliang Zhu et al., The Rural Land Question in China: Analysis and Recommendations Based on 
a Seventeen-Province Survey, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 761, 769-70 (2006).    
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considerable middle class has emerged.4  Although those living in the 
Chinese countryside are better off than they were thirty years ago because of 
land-use reform, rural residents have not seen an increase in living standards 
commensurate with that of their urban counterparts.5  In fact, the income gap 
between rural and urban China continues to increase.6  Because of these 
widening inequalities, tension has grown in China’s rural areas,7 where tens 
of thousands of peasant protests occur each year.8 
The Chinese government views rural unrest as a threat to its stability 
and continued economic growth.9  Aware of the growing frustration in the 
countryside, the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party 
(“CCP”) issued two policy documents in the last year, both of which concern 
the government’s plans for strengthening the land-use rights of rural farmers.  
On October 12, 2008, the CCP issued the Decision on Certain Issues 
Concerning the Advancement of Rural Reform and Development (“2008 
Decision”),10 which the CCP described as “the most significant land reform 
package in three decades.”11  Three months later, on February 2, 2009, the 
CCP together with the State Council, the highest executive organ of the 
                                           
4
 Maureen Fan, In Southeast China, Skepticism on Land Reforms, THE WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 30, 
2008, available at http://en.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=19409.  Twenty-two percent of the 
Chinese population is considered middle class.  Fei-Ling Wang, Brewing Tensions While Maintaining 
Stabilities:  The Dual Role of the Hukou System in Contemporary China, 29.4 ASIAN PERSP. 85, 116 
(2005). 
5
 See Fei-Ling Wang, supra note 4, at 101.  Seventy-one percent of China’s population is 
characterized as rural residents living in rural areas.  Id. at 116. 
6
 Id. at 107 (stating that the gap in living standards and cultures of the urban and rural sectors has 
become increasingly wide in recent decades). 
7
 China’s Rulers Discuss Land Reform, BBC NEWS, Oct. 9, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/7660528.stm (last visited Nov. 20, 2009) (characterizing the tension in rural areas as a growing 
frustration).  
8
 Land Reform in China, supra note 2. 
9
 Edward Cody, In Face of Rural Unrest, China Rolls out Reforms, THE WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 
28, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2006/01/27/AR2006012701588.html. 
10
 Zhong gong zhong yang guan yu tui jin nong cun gai ge fa zhan ruo gan zhong da wen ti de jue 
ding [Decision on Certain Issues Concerning the Advancement of Rural Reform and Development] 
(adopted by the Cent. Comm. of the Chinese Communist Party, Oct. 12, 2008), available at 
http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2008-10/19/content_1125094.htm [hereinafter 2008 Decision].  (Note:  Generally, 
the 2008 Decision is divided up into numbered sections.  Some of these sections consist only of 
unnumbered paragraphs.  Other sections consist of an unnumbered introductory paragraph followed by 
numbered paragraphs.  The Decision also contains an unnumbered introductory and concluding paragraph.  
Thus, within this Comment, citations to the 2008 Decision will take the following forms:  1) a citation to a 
section with only unnumbered paragraphs will consist of a section number (sec. [no.]) followed by a 
paragraph number (para. [no.]) denoting the order in which the paragraph appears within that section; 2) a 
citation to a section with an unnumbered introductory paragraph followed by numbered paragraphs will 
consist of a section number followed by the number that labels the paragraph in that section; 3) a particular 
section’s introductory paragraph will be cited using the section number and “introductory para.”; 4) the 
introductory paragraph of the Decision itself will be cited to using “2008 Decision, introductory para.”) 
11
 Fan, supra note 4.  
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Chinese government, released a document entitled Certain Opinions of the 
State Council and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 
on Promoting the Stable Development of Agriculture and Continuing to 
Increase Farmers’ Incomes in 2009 (“2009 No. 1 Document”).12 
(Collectively, the 2008 Decision and the 2009 No. 1 Document will be 
referred to throughout as the “Policy Documents.”)  The Policy Documents 
articulate the government’s goals for rural development, including increasing 
rural incomes by the year 2020 and providing for better implementation of 
farmers’ land-use rights in order to maintain agricultural yield.13     
The Chinese government and the CCP tout these policy developments 
as a “breakthrough” that will create a “new upsurge” in rural reform.14  In 
the current economic downturn, the Chinese government seems especially 
keen to make rural Chinese citizens into domestic spenders as a way of 
coming through the crisis with the economy intact.15  Indeed, the 2009 No. 1 
Document explicitly states that farmers, and the countryside generally, have 
great significance for expanding domestic demand, and are a highly 
important factor in improving people’s livelihoods.16  Increasing the 
prosperity of the countryside would benefit the Chinese economy as a whole 
by increasing domestic demand.17  But rural residents are more skeptical.  In 
response to the 2008 Decision, a farmer named Li, who lives in the rice and 
corn growing village of Xinyi in Guangdong province, stated that he did not 
think the new reforms “will give us more protection.  We have no 
expectations.”18 
This Comment argues that, viewing the policy documents in light of 
the current legal regime that governs land-use rights, the changes espoused 
in the Policy Documents are well-intentioned but ultimately insufficient to 
raise living standards in the countryside, halt the conversion of agricultural 
                                           
12
 Zhong gong zhong yang Guo wu yuan guan yu er ling ling jiu nian cu jin nong ye wen ding fa 
zhan nong min chi xu zeng shou de ruo gan yi jian [Certain Opinions of the State Council and the Cent. 
Comm. of the Chinese Communist Party on Promoting the Stable Development of Agriculture and 
Continuing to Increase Farmers’ Income in 2009] (adopted by the Cent. Comm. of the Chinese Communist 
Party and the State Council, Dec. 31, 2008), available at http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-
02/01/content_1218759.htm [hereinafter 2009 No. 1 Document].  (Note: Within the 2009 No. 1 Document, 
all paragraphs are numbered except for the four introductory paragraphs and the two concluding 
paragraphs.  This Comment cites to the numbered paragraphs with “para. [no.]”.  This Comment cites to the 
introductory paragraphs with “introductory para. [no.].”) 
13
 Id. introductory para. 2. 
14
 Land Reform in China, supra note 2. 
15
 China Stresses Domestic Demand in Stimulating Growth as Crisis Harms Export, GOV.CN, Mar. 
5, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/05/content_10945808.htm. (last visited Nov. 3, 2009). 
16
 2009 No. 1 Document, supra note 12, introductory para. 4. 
17
 Fei-Ling Wang, supra note 4, at 108 (stating that “raising the purchasing power of the rural 
Chinese majority would probably provide the Chinese economy with a great push in the years ahead”). 
18
 Fan, supra note 4. 
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land, and provide for a more secure grain supply.19  Part II provides an 
overview of the history of rural land-use rights in China since 1949 and the 
current legal structure governing those rights.  Part III introduces the 
changes to current land-use law that the Chinese government and the CCP 
have put forth through the Policy Documents.  Part III also demonstrates that 
these changes have the goals of maintaining grain supply and doubling 
farmers’ incomes.  Part IV argues that while the policy promoted by the 
Chinese government has great potential, it fails to provide rural farmers with 
stable land-use rights that will spur further economic growth and promote 
rural stability.  Part IV also includes recommendations to improve rural land-
use rights.  Part V concludes that the Chinese government’s most recent 
policy, while a step in the right direction, does not constitute a 
“breakthrough” in rural reform. 
II. SINCE 1949, RURAL LAND-USE LAW IN CHINA HAS EVOLVED TO 
CONFER AN INCREASING NUMBER OF RIGHTS ON FARMERS 
From the founding of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”), 1949 
to the present, Chinese farmers had only a brief opportunity to own farmland 
outright.20  In 1951, the Chinese government started collectivizing rural land 
ownership,21 and it was not until 1979 that farmers obtained individualized 
use rights to the land they worked (i.e., farmers had rights to use pieces of 
farmland for finite terms, but rural collectives still held ownership of the 
land).22  Since then, the government has gradually extended the term of 
farmers’ use rights and issued policy documents to better ensure that farmers 
can hold their use rights for the full term.23  The newest legal developments, 
including the Land Administration Law (“LAL”),24 the Law on the 
                                           
19
 Throughout this comment, the terms “land-use rights” or “use rights” mean the obligations and 
benefits that flow from laws governing the way land is put to use. 
20
 Benjamin W. James, Expanding the Gap: How the Rural Property System Exacerbates China’s 




 Keliang Zhu & Roy Prosterman, From Land Rights to Economic Boom: A 17-Province Survey 
Reveals That More Secure Land Rights Can Boost the Incomes and Consumption Power of China’s 850 
Million Rural Residents, CHINA BUS. REV., July-Aug. 2006, at 46, available at 
http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/public/0607/zhu.html. 
23
 See Ping Li, Rural Land Tenure Reforms in China: Issues, Regulations and Prospects for 
Additional Reform, 3 LAND SETTLEMENT AND COOPERATIVES (SPECIAL EDITION) 59, 61 (2003), available 
at http://www.rdiland.org/PDF/PDF_Publications/LP-RuralLandTenureReforms.pdf. 
24
 Land Administration Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 25, 
1986, revised Dec. 29, 1988, Aug. 29, 1998, and Aug. 28, 2004, effective Aug. 28, 2004), translated in 
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/GeneralLawsandRegulations/BasicLaws/P020060620320252818
532.pdf (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Land Administration Law]. 
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Contracting of Rural Land (“RLCL”),25 and the Property Rights Law 
(“Property Law”),26 have focused on strengthening farmers’ use rights while 
maintaining China’s underlying socialist system of collective ownership for 
rural land.27  This Section details the developments that occurred since the 
PRC’s founding in 1949.  Section A discusses the situation of rural land 
rights in the PRC from 1949 until “reform and opening up” in 1978.28  
Section B describes the introduction and development of individualized use 
rights to farmland from 1978 onwards.  Finally, Section C discusses the laws 
currently in effect that pertain to rural land-use, and describes how the 
difficulties in implementing these laws have caused social and economic 
problems in the Chinese countryside.   
A. From 1949 to 1978, China’s Rural Property System was Largely 
Characterized by Collective Ownership 
Upon the founding of the PRC in 1949 under the leadership of the 
CCP and Mao Zedong, the Chinese government confiscated rural land from 
landlords and redistributed it to farmers, effectively granting farmers private 
ownership of land.29  However, this situation did not last long.  From 1951 to 
1956, the CCP forced farmers to consolidate their land holdings into large 
agricultural producers’ cooperatives comprised of about 160 households 
each.30  Then, after 1958, the CCP decided to organize rural households into 
giant “people’s communes” of around 5,000 households each, where 
everyone contributed work to the best of his or her ability and received basic 
necessities in return.31  Most of China’s rural land became collectively 
                                           
25
 Law on Land Contract in Rural Areas (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Aug. 29, 2002, effective Mar. 1 2003), translated in http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-
10/09/content_75300.htm (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Law on Land Contract in Rural Areas].   
26
 Property Rights Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, 
effective Oct. 1, 2007), translated in http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/chn72735.pdf (P.R.C.) [hereinafter 
Property Law]. 
27
 These laws are described in more detail below.  See infra Parts II.C.1, II.C.2, II.C.3, and II.C.4.  
28
 The period of “reform and opening-up” was marked by a wide-ranging program of social and 
economic reforms, initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978.  U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Country 
Profile: China, http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/country-profiles/asia-oceania/china?profile 
=history&pg=30 (last visited Oct. 14, 2009).  The reforms sought to modernize China’s economy, develop 
China’s foreign relations (especially with Western countries), and implement gradual, limited liberalization 
of Chinese society.  Id. 
29
 James, supra note 20, at 458.  
30
 Id.  
31
 Id. at 459. 
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owned and managed by the people's communes, with the exception of small 
plots of homesteads (宅基地) and “self-reserved” lands (自留地).32  
The total collectivization of agriculture marked the beginning of Mao 
Zedong’s “Great Leap Forward,”33 an effort to quickly transform China into 
an industrial power,34 which lasted from 1958 to 1961.35  Collectivization of 
rural land allowed the State to reach into farmers’ grain supply, and the 
government imposed compulsory sales of grain at a low fixed price.36  This, 
coupled with a crippling grain shortage as well as natural disasters, led to 
widespread famine and the deaths of ten to twenty million people, nearly all 
of whom were rural farmers.37  Not until the late 1970s did farmers begin to 
gain more rights to the land they worked.38  
B. The Household Responsibility System Provided Individual Farming 
Households with Contractual Use Rights to Farmland 
Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power as China’s de facto leader in 1978 
began the period of “reform and opening up” (改革开放)39 and changed the 
nature of rural land ownership as well.40  As part of Deng’s process of 
“reform and opening up,” the Chinese government instituted the HRS 
(家庭承包经营制度) in 1979.41  Under this system, village collective 
economic organizations (“collectives”) allocated land-use rights to 
individual households via contract,42 which was a change from the previous 
arrangement where households only possessed the right to use homesteads 
                                           
32
 Frank Xianfeng Huang, The Path to Clarity: Development of Property Rights in China, 17 
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 191, 214 (2004).  Self-reserved lands are small lots assigned to grow produce for self-
consumption.  Theoretically, even these plots were collectively owned.  Id.  The Chinese legal term 
“homestead” only refers to the portion of land on which a family’s home sits, and does not imply the same 
legal protections as associated with this term in the United States.  Geoffrey Korff, The Village and the 
City: Law, Property, and Economic Development in Rural China, 35 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 399, 
414 (2008).   
33
 This period was called the “Great Leap Forward” because Mao envisioned transitioning from 
feudalism directly into communism, thereby “leaping over” a capitalist stage, which was normally required 
in the Marxist historical framework.  James, supra note 20, at 459.  
34
 Dennis Tao Yang, China's Agricultural Crisis and Famine of 1959–1961: A Survey and 
Comparison to Soviet Famines, 50 COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC STUDIES 1, 1 (2008), available at 




 Ching Kwan Lee & Mark Selden, China's Durable Inequality: Legacies of Revolution and Pitfalls 




 See Huang, supra note 32, at 215-16. 
39
 See U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, supra note 28.  
40




 Id.  
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and “self-reserved” lands.43  The collectives distributed these land-use rights 
in a largely egalitarian fashion, although differences among regions persisted 
due to variations in land per capita.44   
The HRS achieved some measure of success, but it did not guarantee 
land-use rights for farmers in the long-term.  Initially, from 1979 to 1984, 
income in rural areas grew under the HRS by eleven percent each year, 
resulting in the narrowest rural-urban income gap since the early 1970s.45  
However, from 1983 to 1998, the duration of the use rights granted to 
individual households and the frequency and types of administrative land 
readjustments varied greatly from region to region.46  Because the HRS did 
not legally require written land-use contracts, which could specify terms of 
use of the allocated land or other significant privileges and obligations 
associated with the use rights, the vast majority of Chinese farm households 
did not have them. 47  These flaws in the HRS made it difficult for farmers to 
rely on their land-use rights as a basis for any future planning of their 
operations.48   
To address these and other problems with the HRS, the Communist 
Party issued a series of policy documents that attempted to improve the 
security of farmers’ land-use rights by: 1) extending the terms of these 
rights; and 2) limiting the ability of local officials to readjust the amount of 
land a household could use.49  When the Chinese government first 
introduced the HRS, farmers entered into land contracts for a period of three 
years.50  Rural Work Document No. 1, which the Party issued in 1984, urged 
local officials to prolong the contractual term of land-use rights to fifteen 
                                           
43
 See Huang, supra note 32, at 214. 
44
 Ping Li, supra note 23, at 60.  
45
 See Zhu & Prosterman, supra note 22, at 46. 
46
 See Ping Li, supra note 2323, at 60.  This conclusion resulted from surveys conducted by the 
Rural Development Institute during this 15-year period.  Ping Li divides “readjustments” into 
comprehensive and partial readjustments.  Id. at 60 n.1.  In comprehensive readjustments, all farmland in a 
village is returned to the collective and redistributed among all households, assigning each household 
entirely new land.  Partial readjustments consist of adding to or taking from a household’s holdings as its 
size changes. 
47
 See Ping Li, supra note 23, at 60.  The new system also brought environmental consequences 
because farmers used lands however they could to increase short-term gain without considering the long-
term consequences of their actions.  See Korff, supra note 32, at 409.  For instance, land-use restrictions 
were unclear, so many farmers with livestock allowed overgrazing, which negatively affected land quality.  
Also, farmers' use of chemical fertilizer increased, resulting in polluted groundwater that generally 
continues to affect all of China.   
48
 See Zhu et al., supra note 3, at 770-71.  
49
 See Ping Li, supra note 23, at 60-61. 
50
 Samuel P.S. Ho & George C.S. Lin, Emerging Land Markets in Rural and Urban China: Policies 
and Practices, 175 CHINA Q. 681, 689 (2003). 
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years or more.51  In 1993, the CCP Central Committee and the State Council 
issued Document No. 11, stating that the use term could be extended for an 
additional thirty years after the fifteen-year use term mentioned in the 1984 
document expired.52  And in 1997, the Notice Concerning Further 
Stabilizing and Protecting the Rural Land Contracting Relationship 
(“Document No. 16”) re-emphasized the need to extend terms of use for 
thirty years.53  This Notice also tackled the readjustment problem by clearly 
prohibiting extensive readjustments, encouraging local adoption of a no-
readjustment policy, and requiring approval of any minor readjustment plans 
by two-thirds of the villager-assembly as well as by the township and 
country governments.54  These policy documents addressed the problems 
with length of use rights and frequent readjustments.  In the years that 
followed, the Chinese government essentially codified the measures in these 
policy documents into formal laws, which similarly concentrate on 
providing farmers with reliable use rights to their land.55 
C. Current Rural Land-Use Law Has Strengthened the Tenure Security of 
Rural Farmers 
The current PRC Constitution, adopted in1982 and amended in 2004, 
provides the foundation for China’s legal system, including the rural land-
use rights system.56  Three statutes give further shape to these land-use 
rights: the 1986 LAL (土地管理法);57 the 2002 RLCL (土地承包法);58 and 
the 2007 Property Law (物权法).59  Supplemented by policy statements 
issued by the Party and the State Council, these laws form the main statutory 
structure for rural land-use rights in China today.  The following sections 
describe the pertinent provisions of these laws in order to give context to the 
subsequent discussion of current Chinese policy regarding those laws and 
the rights that flow from them.  Section 1 will set forth the major 
constitutional principles governing the ownership of land in China.  Sections 
2, 3, and 4 then detail the laws that give further shape to the way land is held 
and used.  Through the different phases of the development of land-use law, 
farmers’ land tenure rights have been increasingly strengthened. 
                                           
51








 See infra Parts II.C.2, II.C.3, and II.C.4. 
56
  See generally XIAN FA (2004) (P.R.C.). 
57
 Land Administration Law, supra note 24. 
58
 Law on Land Contract in Rural Areas, supra note 25.   
59
 Property Law, supra note 26.   
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1. The Constitution Establishes the Principles of Rural Land-Use in 
China 
In contrast to constitutions that set up a system for private ownership 
of land by individuals, the Chinese Constitution mandates ownership of land 
by the state and collectives.  Article 6 articulates the principle that “the basis 
of the socialist economic system of the [PRC] is socialist public ownership 
of the means of production, namely, ownership by the whole people and 
collective ownership by the working people.”60  Article 6 does not, however, 
identify the “collective” owner or elaborate on who comprises that group.  
The basic principles of land ownership are laid out in Article 10, which 
divides land in China into two categories: urban and rural.61  This article 
establishes that “land in the cities is owned by the state and land in the rural 
and suburban areas is owned by collectives.”62  These two articles taken 
together prevent the private ownership of land in China.  Article 5 further 
prevents the Chinese legal system from permitting private land ownership by 
stating “no law or administrative or local rules and regulations shall 
contravene the Constitution.”63  Thus, the Chinese Constitution does not 
leave any room for private persons to own land individually.  
While it forbids individual ownership of land, the Chinese 
Constitution does not prohibit individuals from obtaining use rights to land.  
Indeed, Article 8 establishes the HRS discussed above.64  Further, Article 10 
allows for the transfer of the use of land according to law.65  Article 10 also 
mandates that those who use the land make “rational” use of it.66  This basic 
structure of collective ownership of rural land and granting the issuance of 
individual use rights to rural land serves as a foundation for the more 
detailed provisions of the laws described below.     
 
2. The LAL Was Adopted to Strengthen the Administration of Land 
The LAL is the most comprehensive land administration law in the 
PRC67 and it legally implements many of the constitutional provisions 
                                           
60
 XIAN FA art. 6, § 1 (2004) (P.R.C.).  
61
 James, supra note 20, at 465.   
62
 XIAN FA art. 10, §§ 1, 2 (2004) (P.R.C.).  
63
 Id. art. 5. 
64
 Id. art.8.  See supra Part II.B.  “Working people” who are members of the collective have the right 
to “farm plots of cropland and hilly land allotted for private use, engage in household sideline production, 
and raise privately owned livestock.”  XIAN FA art. 8, § 2 (2004) (P.R.C.). 
65
 XIAN FA art. 10, § 3 (2004) (P.R.C.). 
66
 Id. art. 10, § 5. 
67
 Isabelle I.H. Wan et al., A Professional’s Guide to PRC Land Legislation 106 (5th ed. 2004).  
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discussed above.  As such, it sets out several important provisions, including 
rules about granting use rights to rural farmers through HRS contracts.68  
The purposes of the LAL are to strengthen the administration of land, 
safeguard the socialist public ownership of land, protect developing land 
resources, and ensure the rational use and protection of cultivated land.69  To 
accomplish those goals, Article 3 mandates that “[t]he people’s government 
at all levels shall take measures to make an overall plan for the use of land to 
strictly administer, protect and develop land resources and curb any illegal 
occupation of land.”70  Article 4 elaborates, stating, “A strict control is to 
place on the transformation of land for farm use to that for construction use 
in order to control the total amount of land for construction use and exercise 
a special protection on cultivated land.”71  On paper at least, these provisions 
appear to provide a relatively high degree of tenure security not only to the 
land itself, but also to the tenure rights of farmers. 
The most pertinent provision to the current discussion, Article 14, 
establishes the contractual rights of individual farmers under the HRS.  It 
reads, “[l]and collectively owned by farmers shall be contracted out to be 
run by members of the collective economic organizations for use in crop 
farming, forestry, animal husbandry, and fisheries production under a term of 
30 years.”72  It further establishes that a written contract be formed and 
signed between the contractee and the contractor.73  By signing the contract, 
farmers agree to use the land rationally and for agricultural purposes.74   
The LAL also contains provisions should a farmer want to alter his 
land-use rights during the contractual term.  Article 14 states, “[w]ithin the 
validity of the contract, the adjustment of land contracted by individual 
contractors shall get the consent from two-thirds majority vote of the 
villagers’ congress or over two-thirds of villagers’ representatives.”75  This 
consent must be approved on the township and country levels by requiring a 
two-thirds vote of the village members before land may be reallocated.76   
Finally, the LAL generally designates an organization to act in the 
name of the collective owner of rural land, and provides for a registration 
                                           
68
 See generally Land Administration Law, supra note 24.   
69
 Land Administration Law, supra note 24, art. 1.    
70
 Id. art. 3. 
71
 Id. art. 4 
72
 Id. art. 14.  
73
 Id.  The relationship established is between the farmer and the “collective” as the contractee and 
contractor.  Because farmers may not own land privately, if they want to farm a plot to the exclusion of 
others, they must contract with the legal owners of the land, the collectives.  James, supra note 20, at 468.   
74
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system.77  However, these parts of the LAL are quite vaguely worded.  
Article 10 states, “[i]n lands collectively owned by farmers[,] those [that] 
have been allocated to villagers for collective ownership according to law 
shall be operated and managed by village collective economic organizations 
or villagers’ committee.”78  While appearing to designate a representative to 
make decisions in the name of the collective owners of rural land, this article 
leaves the term “village collective economic organizations” open to wide 
interpretation.  Article 11 provides for the registration of lands that are 
collectively owned, stating that “[The] People’s government at the county 
level shall register and put on record lands collectively owned by farmers 
and issue certificates to certify the ownership concerned.”79  However, the 
article fails to mandate registration at the local level or provide details about 
how such a system should work.  This Comment discusses these two 
deficiencies in more detail below, as they are also present in the most current 
Chinese policy on rural land-use rights.  
 
3. The Law on the Contracting of Rural Land Improves the Land-Use 
System Established in the LAL 
The RLCL, passed in 2002, expands on farmers’ contractual land-use 
rights contained in the LAL by adding to those rights, delineating them in 
greater detail and providing increased protections for those rights.80  Chapter 
Two, Section 1 of the RLCL sets out the rights and obligations of the 
contractor.81  One of the rights the contractor enjoys is to “[transfer] the right 
to land contractual management,”82 a right that the LAL does not contain.  
The RLCL specifically defines the scope of the transferability of land, 
stipulating that farmers may lease, assign, exchange, and carry out other 
transactions of contracted land, with the exception of sale and mortgage.83  
                                           
77
 Id. arts. 10, 11. 
78
 Land Administration Law, supra note 24, art. 10. 
79
 Id. art. 11. 
80
  See generally Law on Land Contract in Rural Areas, supra note 25, art. 1. 
81
 The “contractor” is defined within the RLCL as the “peasant household of the collective economic 
organization concerned.”  Id. art. 15. 
82
 Id. art. 16, § 1.  We chose to translate the Chinese word “流转” as “transfer” and “转让” as 
“assign.”  The online English version of the RLCL translates “流转” as “circulate” and “转让” as 
“transfer.”  See generally Law on Land Contract in Rural Areas, supra note 25.  However, we felt that 
“transfer” is more idiomatic than “circulate” and is general enough to match the wider scope that the 
meaning of “流转” encompasses.  Also, “转让” has the more specific meaning of “assign.”  See A 
CHINESE-ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1660 (Revised ed. 1997) (where “转让” is translated as “transfer the 
ownership of” and “转让人” is translated as “assignor.”)  See also Huang, supra note 32, at 221 (in which 
Huang translates the term “转让” as “assignment”). 
83
  Id. arts. 32-43.   
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The RLCL also mandates that parties to a land-use rights transfer conclude a 
written contract, and gives the particulars for what should be included in that 
contract.84  In addition to granting the ability to transfer land-use rights, the 
RLCL protects farmers’ rights to use the land by ending the practice of land 
readjustment, something that was allowed by the LAL with a two-thirds 
vote.85  The RLCL, like the LAL, does not identify the owner of the 
collective or provide for a detailed registration system.  Section IV of this 
comment will focus on how these provisions could be strengthened to give 
farmers even more secure land-use rights.   
 
4. The Property Law Adheres to the Concept of Socialist Collective 
Ownership and Reiterates the Protections Found in the LAL and 
RLCL 
The Property Law, which became effective in October 2007,86 
provides an equal measure of legal protection to the systems of property 
ownership (state-owned, collectively-owned, and privately-owned) in China, 
but does little to change the way that land is owned, managed, and used in 
the rural areas.87  Primarily, the Property Law explicitly adheres to the basic 
concept that rural collectives operate under a dual system with centralized 
management overseen by the collective and decentralized operation falling 
to the individual household under contract.88  In general, the law reiterates 
the protections and structures provided for in the LAL and RLCL, and 
although the law provides for protection of private property, the law 
unequivocally repudiates the concept that the idea of private property would 
extend to land or other properties exclusively owned by collectives.89        
 
5. The Development of the Chinese Countryside Continues to Lag 
Behind That of Urban Areas Despite the Current Land-Use Legal 
Regime  
Chinese farmers view the rural land-use system as a major factor 
preventing them from improving their financial status as their urban 
                                           
84
 Id. art. 37.  The contract for transfer should include the same information as the original contract 
between the household and the collective economic organization. 
85
 WAN ET AL., supra note 67, at 107. 
86
 Property Law, supra note 26. 
87
 See James, supra note 20, at 473-74 (stating that the new law does very little to change the 
conditions of the peasants).  
88
 Property Law, supra note 26, art. 124. 
89
 See XIAN FA art. 10 (2004) (P.R.C.); Property Law, supra note 26, arts. 41, 56, 63. 
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counterparts have done.90  In fact, the primary cause of rural unrest stems 
from land-related conflicts.91  Despite the protections for rural land-use 
rights codified within the LAL, the RLCL, and the Property Law, the rural-
urban income gap steadily increased throughout the 1990s and into this 
century.92  The inherent implementation problems that flow from the 
Chinese governmental structure (including the weak judiciary and lack of 
oversight and transparency in the government hierarchy) have been well 
documented.93  In the rural land context, if reform in law or policy is to be 
successful, it must be implemented at the grassroots level.94 
Difficulties with implementation and enforcement of rural land-use 
rights at the local level seem to be a central factor in the growing rural-urban 
gap.95  The RLCL and LAL state that each household receive a contract for 
their land-use rights, but not even half of all rural households hold a 
registered contract to their land, and fewer still believe that their thirty-year 
contract will be honored for its total duration.96  Fewer than two years after 
the LAL was revised, the Ministry of Agriculture announced that ninety- 
eight percent of villages had implemented the contracting system.97  
However, the implementation of the LAL was far less successful than the 
statistics indicated, according to a survey of 1,600 households in seventeen 
provinces conducted in 2005 by the Rural Development Institute (“RDI”).98  
The survey showed that only forty-five percent of farm households had 
received a written land-use contract,99 and surveys conducted by the same 
organization in 1999 and 2001 indicated that only forty percent of 
                                           
90
 James, supra note 20, at 476. 
91
 See e.g., Zhu et al., supra note 3, at 766 (“[L]and-related conflicts . . . are now the top rural 
grievance in China”). 
92
 Id. at 765. 
93
 See, e.g., IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 18 (Jianfu Chen et al. 
eds., 2002) (describing the general situation regarding the implementation of law in China as 
unsatisfactory, if not dismal or in crisis). 
94
 Zhu et al., supra note 3, at 834 (“[P]owerful evidence supports the view that any solution to these 
issues must include, as a central element, providing farmers with greater tenure security.  This requires 
significant legal and policy reforms, and their concrete implementation at the grassroots level.”). 
95
 See id. at 833-34. 
96
 RURAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE, OUR WORK: CHINA, 
http://www.rdiland.org/OURWORK/OurWork_China.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2009) [hereinafter RDI].  
These numbers are based on sample surveys conducted in 1999 and 2001.  Id. 
97
 Zhu et al., supra note 3, at 766.   
98
 See generally Zhu et al., supra note 3.  RDI is a Seattle-based organization dedicated to securing 
land rights internationally.  See About RDI, http://www.rdiland.org/ABOUTRDI/About.html (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2009). 
99
 Zhu et al., supra note 3, at 788. 
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households were confident in their land tenure (that their land would not be 
readjusted or expropriated).100    
Additionally, the government can easily circumvent the protections 
afforded by the LAL and the RLCL through the law of eminent domain, 
which allows the government to expropriate a farmer’s land in the public 
interest101 and requires the government to compensate the farmer at a very 
low price if he or she is compensated at all.102  Additionally, rural farmers 
are not entitled to the same free benefits to which urban dwellers are 
entitled, such as basic medical care, elementary education, and social 
security, thus deepening the disparity.103   
Finally, the Chinese government and the CCP consider the rapid 
conversion of arable land to non-agricultural use, which has been extensive 
since the beginning of China’s economic reform, as a pressing issue.104  This 
conversion is spurred by the growing needs of urban areas, including 
urbanization, industrialization, and road construction.105  Such conversion is 
surely troubling to a government focused on raising the income of its rural 
residents by boosting productivity and maintaining farmland for grain 
security purposes.  The following sections examine how current Chinese 
policy focuses on ameliorating these rural concerns by reinforcing the land-
use rights of farmers under the current legal regime, and analyzes the 
probable success of such attempts. 
III. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT AND THE CCP SEEK TO MAINTAIN GRAIN 
SUPPLY AND INCREASE FARMERS’ INCOMES BY INTRODUCING SEVERAL 
POLICY CHANGES TO THE RURAL LAND-USE REGIME  
In October 2008 and February 2009, respectively, the CCP Central 
Committee (中共中央) issued two policy documents concerning rural 
reform —the 2008 Decision and the 2009 No. 1 Document (collectively “the 
Policy Documents”).  The Policy Documents are arguably a part of the 
current body of Chinese law concerning rural land-use rights, because 
government officials often treat similar documents as having the force of 
                                           
100
 See RDI, supra note 96. 
101
 XIAN FA art. 10 (2004) (P.R.C.). 
102
 See Zhu et al., supra note 3, at 825-27.  Studies have shown that it is typical for farmers to receive 
only 10-20% of the compensation.  Id. at 826.  The rest is retained by the collectives or local governments.  
Id. 
103
 Id. at 765.  “Per capita government spending on social welfare for urban residents in the 1990s 
was some thirty times greater than in rural areas.”  Fei-Ling Wang, supra note 4, at 107. 
104
 See Samuel P.S. Ho and George C.S. Lin, Non-Agricultural Land Use in Post-Reform China, 179 
China Q. 758, 760 (2004). 
105
 See id. at 762-64. 
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law.  The Policy Documents state reforms to the current rural land-use rights 
system, which include indefinite terms in farmers’ land-use contracts, 
growth of rural land-use rights markets, and maintaining the agricultural use 
of farmland.  The intended effects of these policy measures are to increase 
farmers’ incomes and maintain grain security.  Sections A and B will attempt 
to situate the Policy Documents within the context of Chinese governance.  
Sections C, D, and E will discuss the specific changes the Policy Documents 
put forth and the goals that they hope to accomplish. 
A. The Policy Documents Reflect Larger Concerns about Stability in the 
Chinese Countryside 
The CCP Central Committee promulgated the 2008 Decision on 
October 12, 2008, under the pressure generated by rural unrest and the 
looming economic crisis.106  The focus of that session was rural reform and 
development, in order to “build up a new socialist countryside.”107 In the 
2008 Decision, the CCP lists the above-mentioned effects of the suggested 
reforms, but also includes language that reflects its concern about stability in 
rural areas.  For instance, the CCP states its desires to “absolutely and 
fundamentally eliminate the phenomenon of poverty,” and continually 
designate the problem of feeding around a billion people as a high priority in 
maintaining peace.108  Such goals indicate that the government believes 
much work must still be done in order to promote a stable and productive 
countryside.109 
Likewise, the 2009 No. 1 Document forms a part of the CCP’s and 
Chinese government’s work towards greater rural stability.110  Each 
February, the CCP Central Committee together with the State Council issue 
a policy directive, entitled the Number One Central Document.111  Since 
2004, these directives have continually highlighted and attempted to address 
the strides yet to be made to ameliorate the critical problems accompanying 
                                           
106
 See 2008 Decision, supra note 10; China Agrees to Land Reform Package, BBC NEWS, Oct. 12, 
2008, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7665907.stm. 
107
 See 2008 Decision, supra note 10, introductory para. 
108
 Id. sec. 2, para. 4.  
109
 See id. sec. 1, paras. 4, 5 and 6. 
110
  2009 No. 1 Document, supra note 12.  The 2009 No. 1 Document was issued jointly on February 
1, 2009 by the CCP Central Committee and the State Council.  Jun Wang, For the Livelihood of Farmers, 
RADIO 86, Feb. 17, 2009, available at http://www.radio86.co.uk/china-insight/from-chinese-
media/9776/for-the-livelihood-of-farmers.  
111
 See No. 1 Central Document Focuses on Rural Issues for 5th Year, CHINAVIEW.CN, Jan. 30, 2008, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-01/30/content_7529372.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2009). 
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the goal of rural development.112  Like those before it, this year’s Number 
One Central Document primarily discusses rural reform.113 
B. The Policy Documents Will Likely be Followed by Government 
Officials as if They Were Law 
Before analyzing the Policy Documents that are the focus of this 
Comment (the 2008 Decision and the 2009 No. 1 Document), it is vital to 
understand the overall role that policy plays in Chinese governance.114  In 
China, the distinction between law and policy is often blurred.115  Policy 
directives issued by the Chinese government and/or the CCP are a common 
form of government mandate and are followed by lower government organs, 
even though they are not technically binding.116  Policy undoubtedly 
embodies the principles that guide major official action as well as revisions 
in the law.117  A glimpse into the treatment and trajectory of past directives 
issued by the CCP and the State Council illustrates the important place of 
                                           
112
 See id.  In the previous five No. 1 Documents, key phrases were “increasing farmers’ incomes” 
(2004), “improving agricultural production capacity” (2005), “pushing forward the modern ‘countryside’ 
scheme” (2006), “developing modern agriculture” (2007), and “fortifying the base of agriculture and 
seeking ways to integrate urban with rural areas” (2008). 
113
 Jun Wang, supra note 110.  
114
  The Policy Documents were issued by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 
and the State Council.  The State Council is the chief administrative authority of the PRC and is most akin 
to the cabinet of the executive branch in the United States government.  KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, 
GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM 177 (2nd ed. 2003).  Although the NPC is the 
main legislative branch of the Chinese government, the State Council is empowered to issue regulations in 
order to implement specific statutory provisions.  XIAN FA art. 89 (2004) (P.R.C.).  The State Council also 
has the authority to issue normative documents entitled “resolutions” (jueyi) and “decisions” (jueding).  
Jianfu Chen et al., supra note 93, at 119.  Such documents have the force of law.  Id.  
115
 ALBERT H.Y. CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA 95 (2004).  
116
 Zhu et al., supra note 3, at 771.  The Policy Documents that are the focus of this comment are not 
technically binding because the CCP, the body that issued the 2008 Decision and jointly issued the 2009 
No. 1 Document with the State Council, is not empowered through the Constitution or the Law on 
Legislation to make laws.  And although the State Council, the joint issuer of the 2009 No. 1 Document, 
and has the authority to make law, the 2009 No. 1 Document was not issued as a regulation or any other 
kind of formally legally binding document.   
117
 A thorough exposition of the interaction between policy and law in China is not possible within 
the confines of this comment.  For a more detailed analysis, see generally MURRAY SCOT TANNER, THE 
POLITICS OF LAWMAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA: INSTITUTIONS, PROCESSES, AND DEMOCRATIC PROSPECTS 
(1999).  In this book, Tanner explains the ill-defined relationship between the formal legal system and the 
Communist Party: “The perennial debate over the relative authoritativeness of ‘laws’ versus Party ‘policy,’ 
a debate which has raged since the earliest years of the People’s Republic, has never been resolved with 
any useful clarity.  Many Party leaders and legal scholars have argued that laws possess a special 
authoritativeness and stability because they reflect the Party’s distilled wisdom and experience, developed 
in carrying out policy over a long period . . . . [T]he Party has never resolved the authoritativeness debate 
by taking the above assertion to its appropriate logical conclusion and officially declaring state law superior 
to Party policy.”  Id. at 32-33.   
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policy in Chinese governance.  The treatment of the Central Committee’s 
decisions demonstrates that policy has tangible, quasi-legal effects.  First, in 
China, the CCP shapes and decides all major political, social, and economic 
policy issues.118  One source of such policy is the annual plenum of the CCP 
Central Committee.119  Policy resulting from Central Committee plenums is 
often given pro forma approval by the National People’s Congress (“NPC”) 
during its annual meeting in March.120  Second, those in China talk about 
policy as if it had binding legal effect.  For example, in discussing the 2008 
Decision, scholars and government advisers stated that the new policy would 
allow rural farmers to engage in the unrestricted trade of their land-use 
contracts.121 
Also, government officials use policy during speeches to spur change 
and encourage adherence to Party laws and policies.  The latest example of 
this phenomenon comes from the fourth plenary session of the seventeenth 
CCP Central Committee, which convened in September 2009.122  The goal 
of that plenum was to enhance democracy and fight corruption.123  In 
October, a senior Chinese leader, Zhou Yongkang, referred to the policy 
issued from the plenum and not Chinese law when he called for efforts to 
improve the work of the Chinese judiciary.124  Anecdotally, these examples 
show the strong role that policy plays in Chinese governance.   
Additionally, policy issued by the Chinese government often 
eventually becomes a part of the legal corpus.  For example, in 1993, the 
                                           
118
 LIEBERTHAL, supra note 114, at 234 (stating that the “Chinese Communist party retains the power 
to decide all major political, social, and economic policy issues.”).  Lieberthal continues, “[T]he party’s 
continuing relevance stems from its ongoing monopoly on the exercise of political power . . . . party bodies 
make the major decisions on the major substantive issues that confront not only the government but all 
public institutions.”  Id. at 241.  Also, according to Chinese law scholar Randall Peerenboom, the CCP 
Central Committee is one of three groups that have lawmaking power in China (the other two are the State 
Council and the NPC).  RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD THE RULE OF LAW 223 
(Cambridge 2002).  Although the CCP has lost the ability to control unilaterally control the lawmaking 
process, Party power has not disappeared.  Id. at 189.  In fact, “[t]he Party undeniably is still a major force, 
capable of getting its way on key issues . . . .”  Id. 
119
 LIEBERTHAL, supra note 114, at 174.  The Central Committee meets once or twice a year to 
discuss and announce policies.  Id.  The 2008 Decision was adopted by the third plenary session of the 
Seventeenth CCP Central Committee.  See 2008 Decision, supra note 10.    
120
 See, Edward Wong, China Announces Land Policy Aimed at Promoting Income Growth in 
Countryside, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/13/world/asia/13china.html (last 




 See CPC Central Committee Closes Plenum, Vows to Enhance Democracy, Fight Corruption, 
CHINA VIEW, Sept. 18, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-09/18/content_12075992.htm (last 




 Senior Chinese Leader Calls for Strengthened Efforts in Judicial Work, CHINA VIEW, Oct. 10, 
2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-10/10/content_12208696.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2009). 
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Chinese government and the CCP Central Committee issued a policy 
directive that set forth the intention of providing farmers with thirty-year 
contractual rights.125  The thirty-year policy was then implemented at the 
village level and put into practice.126  Five years later, in 1998, the policy 
provision was formally codified as law in the LAL.127 
In short, policy in China operates differently than it does elsewhere in 
the world; policy has immediate, tangible, and quasi-legal effects.  Thus, 
when discussing the Policy Documents that are the subject of this comment, 
one must bear in mind that policy has repercussions beyond the four corners 
of the documents.  This is especially important when contemplating whether 
the current policy of the Chinese government represents a “breakthrough” in 
rural reform. 
C. The Policy Documents Suggest Three Main Changes to Current Rural 
Land-Use Law   
Taken together, the Policy Documents promote three major changes to 
rural land-use law.  First, the Policy Documents indicate that the contractual 
land-use terms will expand from thirty to an indefinite number of years.  
Second, the CCP and the government institute reforms that will spur the 
growth of rural land-use rights markets.  Finally, the CCP and the 
government reinforce their commitment to maintaining the agricultural use 
of farmland by mandating that agricultural land not be converted to non-
agricultural uses. 
 
1. The Policy Documents Suggest that the Duration of Rural Contractual 
Land-Use Rights Will be Indefinite 
In both Policy Documents, the government emphasizes a desire to 
eliminate the thirty-year time frame for farmers’ contractual land-use rights.  
The language of both documents extends this thirty-year right indefinitely.  
The 2008 Decision indicates the need to “[g]rant farmers more complete and 
secure contractual land management rights; the stability of the present land 
contract relationships is to be ensured and these relationships will remain 
unchanged for a very long time” (“长久不变”) (emphasis added).128  
                                           
125
 Zhu et al., supra note 3, at 771.  At that time, farmers had fifteen-year contractual rights in their 
land and the government was concerned about the rural land-use tenure problem.  Id. 
126
 Telephone Interview with Keliang Zhu, Staff Attorney, Rural Development Institute (Feb. 6, 
2009). 
127
 Land Administration Law, supra note 24, art 14.  
128
 2008 Decision, supra note 10, sec. 3, para. 1. 
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Similarly, the 2009 No. 1 Document mandates, “give farmers more complete 
and guaranteed land contract rights, maintain the stability of the current land 
contract relationship, [these relationships] will remain unchanged for a very 
long time” (“长久不变”) (emphasis added).129 
During the drafting of the 2008 Decision, the exact language referring 
to farmers’ contractual term changed twice.130  One draft stated that 
contractual rights would remain unchanged “for a long term” 
(“长期不变”).131  The other stated that land-use rights would be “fixed 
perpetually” (“永久不变”).132  The central leadership opted for the more 
flexible language (“remain unchanged for a very long time”).133  Although 
the 2008 Decision does not define the phrase, if the policy is implemented 
by local governments, the land-use rights of farmers could be on par with or 
possibly extend beyond those for urban dwellers, who currently enjoy 
seventy-year rights to the land they occupy.134  Granting farmers indefinite 
rights to farm their land would be an unprecedented step towards promoting 
a more stable Chinese countryside that, coupled with the two changes below, 
would represent a dramatic shift in the way that land is held and used. 
 
2. The Policy Documents Promote the Growth of Markets in Rural Land-
Use Rights by Removing Restrictions on Assignment and Providing 
for Necessary Market Institutions  
The Policy Documents also express a desire to create rural markets for 
the transfer of land-use rights,135 specifically by providing the institutions 
necessary to build up such markets and by removing the legal limit on 
assignment of use rights contained in the RLCL.136  In the 2009 No. 1 
Document, the CCP states as a goal:  “Establish and perfect markets for 
transferring contractual land management rights. . . . Encourage localities 
that have the capacity to develop transfer service organizations to provide 
information sharing, advice on regulations, valuation, contract signing 
                                           
129
 2009 No. 1 Document, supra note 12, para. 17.  
130




 Id.  
133
 2008 Decision, supra note 10, sec. 3, para. 1; 2009 No. 1 Document, supra note 12, para. 17. 
134
 Cheng zhen guo you tu di shi yong quan chu rang he zhuan rang zan xing tiao li [Interim 
Regulations Concerning the Assignment and Transfer of the Right to the Use of State-Owned Land in the 
Urban Areas] (promulgated by the State Council, May 19, 1990, effective May 19, 1990), art. 12, 
LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Nov. 3, 2009) (P.R.C.) (providing for the seventy-year land-use term); 
Property Law, supra note 26, art. 149 (providing for automatic renewal). 
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 2008 Decision, supra note 10, sec. 3, para. 2; 2009 No. 1 Document, supra note 12, para. 18. 
136
 See 2008 Decision, supra note 10, sec. 3, para. 2. 
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services, and dispute resolution, etc. for the transferring parties.”137  This 
statement demonstrates the CCP’s wish to build up markets for land-use 
rights by providing for the supporting institutions to run them. 
In the 2008 Decision, the CCP seems to suggest another way to 
promote the development of markets for land-use rights: removing the 
limitation on the assignment of use rights contained in RLCL Article 37.138  
Within the RLCL, Article 32 lists four specific ways by which farmers can 
transfer their land-use rights: subcontract, lease, exchange, and 
assignment.139  Article 37 limits farmers’ use of assignment by requiring 
them to obtain consent from the issuer of the land contract before assigning 
their use rights to a third party.140  The 2008 Decision lists the same four 
ways to transfer use rights as contained in RLCL Article 32: 
Establish and perfect markets for transferring contractual land 
management rights, allow farmers to transfer contractual land 
management rights . . . by means of subcontract, lease, 
exchange, assignment or entering into a joint-stock cooperative, 
develop various forms of management on an appropriate 
scale.141 
Although both the 2008 Decision and the RLCL list the same four means of 
transfer, the language of the 2008 Decision lacks the limitation on 
assignment.142  By not including this limitation in the 2008 Decision, the 
CCP seems to imply that farmers will not be subject to it in the future, and 
will be able to more freely transfer their use rights to other parties using 
rural use rights markets.  As discussed in Section III.D below, more transfers 
of use rights to farmland will likely result in the farming of larger plots, 
which will likely lead to increased efficiency in crop production, higher 
production levels, and thus an increase in farmers’ incomes and maintenance 
of grain security. 
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 2009 No. 1 Document, supra note 12, para. 18. 
138
 See 2008 Decision, supra note 10, sec. 3, para. 2. 
139
 Law on Land Contract in Rural Areas, supra note 25, art. 32.   
140
 Id. art. 37.  See also Huang, supra note 32, at 221.  
141
 2008 Decision, supra note 10, sec. 3, para. 2. 
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 Id. 
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3. In an Effort to Halt the Non-Agricultural Use of Farmland, the Policy 
Documents Mandate Agricultural Use of Farmland  
Non-agricultural use of farmland is a pressing government concern.143  
The LAL and the RLCL highlight the importance of maintaining the 
agricultural use of farmland, but they fall short of prohibiting the use of 
farmland for non-agricultural purposes.  The LAL requires each province in 
China to designate at least eighty percent of cultivated land as basic 
farmland.144  Article 19 of the LAL states, “[s]trictly protect the basic 
farmland and control the occupation of agricultural land for non-agricultural 
purposes.”145  Article 22 elaborates, “[t]he amount of land used for urban 
construction shall conform to the standards prescribed by the State so as to 
make full use of the existing land for construction purposes, not to occupy or 
to occupy as little agricultural land as possible.”146  And Article 38 stipulates 
that unused land will be given priority development for agricultural 
purposes.147  The RLCL also falls short of using mandatory language to 
protect the agricultural use of land.  Similar to the LAL, Article 8 of the 
RLCL provides that contracted land may not be used for non-agricultural 
purposes, without approval granted according to law.148 
In contrast, the Policy Documents employ stronger language for the 
protection of farmland.  The 2008 Decision states that conversion of land to 
non-agricultural use will not be allowed.149  In Section 19 of the 2009 No. 1 
Document, the government directs that “the strictest system for the 
protection of agricultural land and the strictest system for economizing land 
use” must be implemented in each village.150  Specifically, localities must 
designate basic farmland and establish a uniform system of farmland 
protection.151  Also, the 2009 No. 1 Document strictly forbids localities from 
adjusting their land-use plans or modifying the location of basic farmland 
without government authorization.152  In addition, the 2009 No. 1 Document 
calls for localities to examine the responsibilities and goals of local 
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144
 Land Adminiatration Law, supra note 24, art. 34.  
145
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 Law on Land Contract in Rural Areas, supra note 25, art. 8.  
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governments relating to the protection of agricultural land.153  In furtherance 
of such protection, localities are instructed to implement an audit system 
calling for the termination of leaders and cadres who do not adhere to the 
protection of cultivated land.154  Direct disciplinary action against local 
government officials charged with management of rural land is a threat not 
found in the LAL or the RLCL.  By insisting that the amount of arable land 
not diminish,155 the policy documents seem to strengthen the central 
government’s commitment to prevent urban encroachment and provide for 
grain supply security. 
D. The Two Major Objectives of These Policy Changes Are Increasing 
Farmers’ Incomes and Maintaining Grain Security 
The CCP and the Chinese government anticipate that the above three 
changes to farmers’ land-use rights156 will achieve two major objectives: 1) 
increase farmers’ incomes and 2) help maintain grain security.  The Policy 
Documents connect each objective to the three changes by describing the 
changes and repeatedly mentioning the objectives throughout.  In addition, 
each objective reflects concerns that are grounded in China’s current reality. 
 
1. The CCP and Chinese Government Hope to Double Farmers’ Incomes 
Both Policy Documents state the goal of increasing farmers’ incomes 
in various places.  Thus, it seems that increasing farmers’ incomes motivates 
the policy measures the Documents describe, including the three changes to 
farmers’ land-use rights.  The 2008 Decision mentions “doubling farmers’ 
per-capita net incomes” early on as one of the “basic goals and tasks of rural 
reform” to achieve by the year 2020.157  It also states increasing farmers’ 
incomes as a requirement for advancing scientific development,158 and lists 
it as a criterion for assessing the performance of county officials.159  The title 
of the 2009 No. 1 Document contains the words “Increase Farmers’ 
Incomes.”160  It also states that “wavering of farmers’ incomes must be 






 2008 Decision, supra note 10, sec. 3, para. 2; 2009 No. 1 Document, supra note 12, para. 19. 
156
 These changes are: making contractual use-rights terms indefinite, removing restrictions on 
assignment and providing institutional support for rural use-rights markets, and maintaining the agricultural 
use of farmland.  See supra Parts III.C.1, III.C.2 and III.C.3. 
157
 2008 Decision, supra note 10, sec. 2, para. 2.  Specifically, this section of the document calls for 
doubling farmers’ per capita income by 2020.  Id.  
158
 2008 Decision, supra note 10, sec. 1, para. 4. 
159
 Id. sec. 6, para.1. 
160
 See 2009 No. 1 Document, supra note 12, title. 
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resolutely guarded against,”161 and that increasing farmers’ incomes should 
be a criterion for measuring the performance of local officials.162  The 
prominence of increasing farmers’ incomes in the Policy Documents 
demonstrates that this goal motivates the CCP’s and the government’s policy 
measures in the documents, which include the three changes to rural land-
use rights.  
The desire of the CCP to increase farmers’ incomes likely arises from 
the widening gap in wealth and living standards between rural and urban 
areas,163 as discussed above.164  In 1964, the average Chinese urban income 
was 2.2 times the average rural income.165  By 2006, that difference 
increased to 3.2.166  According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
the real growth rate of average rural incomes overtook the real growth rate 
of average urban income (as of 2008); even so, the disparity between the 
absolute annual incomes of rural and urban residents increased by a factor of 
twelve from 1981 to 2008.167  In sum, the disparity between urban and rural 
incomes is a very real problem that causes the CCP and Chinese government 
great concern, which the Policy Documents reflect.  
 
2. Maintaining Grain Security is a Central Goal of the CCP and Chinese 
Government 
In addition to increasing farmers’ incomes, it appears that maintaining 
grain security also motivates the measures set out in the Policy Documents, 
since the Chinese government and the CCP repeatedly mention their 
concerns about grain security at various points in the documents.  According 
to the 2008 Decision, “[S]olving the problem of feeding around one billion 
people [must be] continually designated as a high priority in running the 
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 Id. introductory para. 3. 
162
 Id. concluding para. 1.  
163
 See 2008 Decision, supra note 10, sec. 1, para. 5 (stating, “[D]isparities in regional development 
and incomes of rural and urban residents are expanding, [and] changing the backward face of the 
countryside becomes urgent”). 
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 See supra Part II.C.5. 
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 Fei-Ling Wang, supra note 4, at 107 (citing Yicai Zhong, Cheng xiang er yuan she hui de rong he 
yu yin nong jin cheng [The Merging of the Dualistic Urban and Rural Societies and the Drawing of 
Peasants Into Cities], SHE HUI KE XUE [SOC. SCI.] 54, 55 (1995)).  
166
 NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA, CHINA STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 10-2 (2007), 
available at http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2007/indexeh.htm.  The authors of this comment calculated 
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capita net income of rural households. 
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 2008 nian san ji du jing ji shu ping: suo xiao cheng xiang shou ru cha ju ying dui guo ji jin rong 
wei ji [2008 Three-Quarter Economic Review: Narrowing the Rural-Urban Income Gap to Respond to the 
Global Financial Crisis] ZHONGGUO XIN XI BAO [CHINA INFORMATION TIMES], Nov. 7, 2008, 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/ztfx/2005sbnjjsp/t20081107_402515209.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2009). 
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country well and maintaining peace.”168  Also, as with increasing farmers’ 
incomes, the 2008 Decision lists maintaining grain security as a requirement 
of scientific development.169  The 2009 No. 1 Document states that “[w]ith 
the high base quotas resulting from five years of continuous increases in 
agricultural production, the task of maintaining grain security and 
development has become ever more onerous . . . .”170  In the same paragraph, 
the document states that “decreases in grain production must be resolutely 
guarded against.”171  Thus, it is apparent that the Policy Documents connect 
the CCP’s and government’s worries about grain security to the policy 
measures that the Documents enumerate, which include the three changes to 
farmers’ land-use rights. 
Statistical data confirm the Chinese government’s concerns about 
grain security.172  Between 1984 and 2002, the level of security in China’s 
supply of grain products consistently decreased.173  In particular, from 1997 
to 2002, consumption of grain in the form of animal feed contributed in 
large part to an increase in demand and decrease in supply of grain in China, 
resulting in a grain shortage.174  However, increased demand for animal feed 
is not the only cause of China’s shrinking grain supply; the continually 
decreasing amount of farmland in China is also diminishing its grain 
reserves.175  Among the many factors that influence a country’s food 
production and supply, the amount of available farmland is one of the most 
crucial.176  In the case of China, many experts agree that loss of farmland is 
undermining China’s food production capacity.177  This information 
demonstrates that the CCP’s and government’s goal of maintaining grain 
security is not only connected to the three changes to use rights mentioned 
above, but it is also grounded in the reality of low grain production levels in 
China.   
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E. The Three Use Rights Changes Will Contribute to Achieving the 
CCP’s and Government’s Goals in the Policy Documents 
Providing farmers with use rights of an indefinite term, maintaining 
the agricultural use of farmland, and facilitating trade in land-use rights will 
contribute to achieving the CCP’s and government’s goals of increasing 
farmers’ incomes and maintaining grain security.  The three changes 
promote these goals by increasing farmers’ rates of long-term investment in 
their contract land, boosting agricultural production, and limiting the amount 
of farmland converted to non-agricultural land.  As such, the changes will 
probably play an important, perhaps even essential, role in achieving the 
CCP’s and Chinese government’s goals. 
 
1. Indefinite Terms for Rural Land-Use Rights Will Further the CCP and 
Government’s Policy Goals 
Making farmers’ use rights indefinite will provide farmers with 
greater assurance that they will profit from their investments.  Indefinite use-
rights terms allow for long-term, land-saving investments; enable farmers to 
avoid negotiations for a new use-rights contract; and increase farmers’ 
confidence that their heirs will profit from investments they make.  With 
greater assurance that they will reap a profit from long-term investments, 
farmers will actually make these investments, which will aid in achieving 
the CCP’s and Chinese government’s policy goals of increasing incomes and 
maintaining grain security.   
Various studies have documented the connection between indefinite 
use rights terms and Chinese farmers’ increased investment in their land.  
One study conducted in 1994 in Hebei Province concluded that the longer 
the time a farmer knows he or she can farm a plot, the more likely he or she 
is to make long-term, land-saving investments.178  Another report from RDI, 
based on 1994 fieldwork in Anhui and Shandong, stated that most farmers 
interviewed “would make significant incremental improvements [to their] 
land under a policy of perpetual use rights.” 179  Hence, empirical evidence 
suggests that farmers in China take the length of their use rights term into 
account when deciding whether to invest in their farmland.  Currently, 
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 See Scott Rozelle et al., Tenure, Land Rights, and Farmer Investment Incentives in China, 19 
AGRIC. ECON. 63, 68-69 (1998).  These investments include the use of organic manure and phosphate 
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farmers have contractual terms of thirty years in which to realize their 
investments.180  This may seem like a considerable amount of time.  
However, the studies indicate that granting farmers an indefinite term for 
their use rights will motivate them to make even more long-term investments 
than they do now.181   
In addition, indefinite use terms allow farmers to avoid having to bear 
the burden of negotiating a renewal of their contracts with local officials, 
resulting in use rights that are more stable than the ones farmers currently 
possess.  Presently, a farmland contractor (i.e. a farming household) “may 
continue the contract according to the relevant national rules” after the 
contract’s thirty-year term has ended.182  It seems logical, though, that a 
contract with an indefinite term would be more stable than the current 
limited-term contracts, in spite of farmers’ ability to renew the limited-term 
contracts.  Under a limited-term contract, the contractor must affirmatively 
negotiate a renewal with the collective, which might require him or her to go 
through bureaucratic hassles and make concessions to obtain a new contract.  
Under a contract with an indefinite term, the contractor must only bear such 
a burden if the collective moves to terminate the contract.183   
Finally, indefinite terms for land-use rights enable farmers to better 
ensure that their children can keep this important income source within their 
families.  In the current use rights system, a farmer’s use rights contract can 
be inherited.184  Although the children can negotiate for a new contract when 
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 Land Administration Law, supra note 24, art. 14. 
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 See PROSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 179, at 29 (stating that even when farmers have been clearly 
told that they have fifteen-year ownership rights, they do not make long-term investments, and that farmers 
will not feel secure in their use rights unless they are granted perpetual use rights with the right of 
inheritance). 
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 Property Law, supra note 26, art. 126.  It is not clear to which “relevant provisions” the Property 
Law alludes to here.  James, supra note 20, at 474. 
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recent evidence that problems in implementing this provision still exist.  According to RDI’s 2005 
seventeen province survey, 30.3% of villages that had contracted with farmers to give them thirty-year 
rights nevertheless readjusted land allocations after those contracts were formed.  Zhu et al., supra note 3, 
at 794. 
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 According to the RLCL, “The benefits derived from the contract which are due to contractor shall 
be inherited in accordance with the provisions of the Succession Law.”  Law on Land Contract in Rural 
Areas, supra note 25, art. 31. 
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the inherited contract ends, if the contract they inherit has an indefinite term, 
they do not have to negotiate and will more likely continue making long-
term investments in the land.   
In sum, indefinite use rights terms will prove to be more stable than 
the current limited use rights terms, boosting farmers’ confidence that they 
(and their children) will realize a return on their investments.  More stable 
use rights will motivate them to make longer-term, land-saving investments 
in their contracted land.  Such investments will increase agricultural 
production levels,185 thereby contributing to increasing farmers’ incomes and 
to maintaining grain security.  
 
2. Prohibitions on Conversion of Agricultural Land Will Also Further the 
CCP and Chinese Government’s Policy Goals  
By helping to slow the conversion of farmland to non-agricultural 
land, prohibitions against such conversion will also boost farmers’ 
confidence in the profitability of their investments, thereby aiding in the 
achievement of the CCP’s and Chinese government’s two main policy goals.  
In the two decades before 2003, village officials and cities converted a large 
amount of rural land to non-agricultural uses, and much of the converted 
land was farmland.186  Once a farmer’s contracted land is used for a non-
agricultural purpose, he or she cannot continue to farm the land and realize a 
profit from any investment he or she has made in the land.  If rules are 
instituted that prohibit and deter these conversions, farmers will gain more 
confidence that enough time is available for their investments in the land to 
pay off.187  Consequently, they will invest more in their contracted land, with 
the effect of increasing agricultural production.188  Increases in production 
will in turn help achieve the government and the CCP’s two main policy 
goals, especially the goal of maintaining grain security.  Such prohibitions 
against conversion to non-agricultural use will help maintain a specific 
amount of land available for grain production.  As stated above, the 
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decreasing amount of agricultural land in China is threatening its grain 
supply.189  But if prohibitions are in force that limit the speed at which 
farmland is converted to non-agricultural uses, China can maintain enough 
of its land for grain production, and avert the looming threat of a grain 
shortage due to an insufficient amount of farmland available for grain 
production.  
 
3. Building up Markets to Promote Trade in Land-Use Rights Will 
Likewise Further the Policy Goals of the CCP and the Chinese 
Government 
Lastly, facilitating trade in land-use rights will result in more efficient 
farming.  In addition, markets will increase the value of farmland, providing 
farmers with a large source of wealth with which to make investments in 
their land.  More efficient farming and an added impetus to increase 
investments in farmland will increase production levels, thereby helping to 
achieve the policy goals of increasing farmers’ incomes and maintaining 
grain security described above.  
Thriving markets for rural land-use rights would facilitate 
consolidation of those rights, resulting in more efficient farming and 
increased production levels.  Research indicates, however, that rural markets 
in land-use rights are still in developing stages.190  Specifically, the unstable 
nature of farmers’ land-use rights constrains these markets, since transferees 
in such markets cannot be sure that they will possess the use rights sold to 
them in the long-term.191  It has been argued that facilitating the growth of 
rural markets in land-use rights will “allow for ‘voluntary, gradual 
reallocation’ of land rights to the most efficient users [of the farmland], 
either farmer households or even large-scale agribusiness[es].”192  Since 
farmers and agribusinesses can work larger plots of land more efficiently, 
and increased efficiency logically results in increased production, they can 
increase agricultural production levels if they can consolidate their holdings 
of land-use rights.   
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Thriving markets for rural land-use rights would also increase the 
value of those use rights.193  With value added to their land-use rights, 
farmers could make more long-term investments in their land.194  More 
investments in farmland would in turn increase production.195  Hence, like 
the increase in efficiency described above, the added value to land-use rights 
would also enhance agricultural productivity.   
By calling for the build-up of markets for rural land-use rights as well 
as the maintenance of farmland for agricultural use and indefinite use rights 
terms, the CCP and the Chinese government hope to increase farmers’ 
incomes and maintain the nation’s grain security.  It appears likely that the 
three changes in the current system of land-use rights will contribute 
significantly to achieving those goals.  However, the question remains 
whether additional measures are necessary to do so. 
IV. THE THREE CHANGES MENTIONED IN THE POLICY DOCUMENTS 
REQUIRE SEVERAL ACCOMPANYING MEASURES TO BE SUCCESSFUL  
The Policy Documents introduce many positive measures.  The three 
policy changes fall short, however, of representing a “breakthrough” in rural 
reform.  In order for the policy to be successful, the Chinese government and 
the CCP must specify which organization has authority to exercise collective 
ownership rights, create a registration system for land-use rights to farmland, 
and educate farmers about those rights.   
A. The Chinese Government Should Designate the Natural 
Village/Villagers’ Group as the Rural Organization That Exercises 
Collective Ownership Rights  
While the reforms to land-use rights in the Policy Documents ensure a 
greater degree of land tenure security for farmers, they fail to specify exactly 
who represents rural collectives and exercises ownership rights to 
collectively-owned agricultural land.  For instance, the 2009 No. 1 
Document states the goal of “plac[ing] ownership rights in the hands of the 
collective organization that is the legally-determined [entity] to exercise 
ownership rights,”196 but does not specify which organization is meant.  This 
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lack of an identifiable collective owner is nothing new to the Chinese legal 
system; the LAL and the RLCL only refer to the “collective” as the legal 
owner of collectively owned land without specifying who this “collective” 
is,197 and the 2007 Property Law likewise falls short of resolving this 
ambiguity.198  In fact, this ambiguity has allowed local rural governments in 
China to implement a structure in which higher-level and not lower-level 
organizations in the rural collective hierarchy exercise ownership rights.199  
The ambiguity has also made it easier for township and village cadres to 
illegally convert collective farmland to commercial use by negotiating deals 
without consulting the farmers with use rights to that land.200  To remedy 
these problems, the CCP and the Chinese government should designate the 
villagers’ group, which villagers form out of a democratically elected 
body,201 as the single rural organization with authority to act as the owner of 
collective farmland.  Otherwise, the urbanization process and haste to 
develop real-estate and industry in China will continue to threaten farmers’ 
land-use rights, regardless of the term length of these rights.  
The nonexistence of a legally designated holder of collective 
ownership rights to rural land has been a problem since the dismantling of 
the commune system in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  The communes 
contained three levels: the commune, the production brigade, and the 
production team.202  In 1962, the production team was identified as the 
owner of agricultural lands.203  After this system was dismantled and the 
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HRS was instituted, the township/town (乡/镇) replaced the commune, the 
administrative village (行政村) replaced the brigade, and the natural 
village/villagers’ group (自然村/村民小组)204 replaced the production 
team.205  The natural village/villagers’ group is the basic unit of this rural 
collective hierarchy.206  According to the PRC Organic Law of Villagers’ 
Committees, the villagers’ group is a subset of the villagers’ committee,207 
which is a body that a village’s inhabitants democratically elect every three 
years.208 
Although the natural village/villagers’ group should have logically 
replaced the production team as the designated owner of collectively held 
rural land,209 the Chinese government has yet to designate such an owner.  
The revised Land Administration Law and the interpretation issued by the 
NPC Legal Committee fail to specify the organization that is the legal holder 
of collective ownership.210  This law only states, “The land owned by the 
farmers’ collective is by law owned by the farmers’ collective of the 
village.”211  The 2007 Property Law also does not specify a single 
organization in the rural collective hierarchy (township/town, administrative 
village, natural village/villagers’ group) to exercise collective ownership 
rights.  It states that either the village’s collective economic organization or 
the villagers’ committee shall exercise ownership rights to collectively held 
lands,212 but leaves the ambiguity in place by not choosing a single 
organization to exercise ownership rights and not defining the “collective 
economic organization.”213 
As a consequence of this ambiguity, local rural governments can 
implement a structure of land ownership rights that prevents the natural 
village/villagers’ group from claiming ownership to collectively held rural 
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land.214  In practice, the administrative village, under supervision of the 
township, usually acts as the formal party issuing a land contract in the name 
of the collective—not the natural village/villagers’ group.215  A Chinese 
government official was quoted as saying, “It is like the ownership rights to 
land have been silently stolen from the natural village and vested in a level 
higher.”216  Thus, as long as no legally designated owner of collective rural 
land exists, localities are free to implement a system in which higher-level 
collective organizations exercise ownership rights to rural land instead of the 
natural village/villagers’ group.  
In addition to preventing the most basic level of the collective 
hierarchy from exercising ownership rights to collectively owned land, the 
current legal ambiguity also facilitates township or village cadres’ illegal 
conversion of collective land to commercial use.  The conversion of 
collectively owned agricultural land to land that can be used for commercial 
purposes normally requires a transfer of ownership title from the collective 
organization to the state.217  In spite of this requirement, sometimes township 
or village cadres approve the construction of commercial developments on 
collectively owned agricultural land without transferring title from the 
collective to the state, and often do so in their personal capacity.218  It seems 
that if Chinese laws designated the natural village/villagers’ group as the 
organization to exercise collective ownership rights, the natural village 
would have more power to stop township and village cadres from effectively 
representing the collective in these development deals.  Thus, the CCP and 
the Chinese government should grant the authority to exercise collective 
ownership rights to the natural village/villagers’ group, because it is formed 
from a democratically elected body,219 and would provide farmers with 
stronger representation of their interests in the face of the push for 
development. 
B. The Policy Documents Include Proposals for a Land-Use Rights 
Registration System, but These Proposals Are Not Comprehensive  
In China there is currently no land registration system in rural areas.220  
A land registration system is necessary for a fully developed market 
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economy because it gives land users security to make investments in their 
land, increasing productivity and boosting incomes. 221  Therefore, without 
secure land-use tenure, land is rendered what the Peruvian economist 
Hernando de Soto has dubbed “dead capital.”222  The 2007 Property Law 
calls for the creation of a unified, national registration system for real 
properties, which includes land and houses.223  The law fails to specify, 
however, how such a system should be created, which government agency 
will be in charge, or how a new rural land registration system should be 
merged with the urban one.224  The Policy Documents indicate, nevertheless, 
that the government and the CCP are aware that registration is a crucial 
component to providing stability to the countryside.  Like the Property Law, 
the 2009 No. 1 Document reiterates that a rural land contracting system 
should be established, but it also does not instruct local governments on how 
to implement such a system.225  The Chinese government will fail to provide 
farmers with more secure contractual land-use rights if land-use rights are 
not registered, farmers do not have a record of their land rights, no record of 
those rights is filed and maintained with the local government, and farmers 
are not educated about the terms of their use rights.   
 
1. The Chinese Government Must Create a Registration System for Rural 
Land 
The lack of a registration system for rural land creates uncertainty and 
hampers the formation of land markets.226  According to Tim Hanstad, CEO 
of the Rural Development Institute, “Land is a fundamental resource that is 
most effectively used and exchanged when the rights to land are 
registered.”227  Although Hanstad discusses registration systems in terms of 
ownership of or title to the land, his argument can be extended to use rights 
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or tenure in the land.  Land tenure security encourages farmers to invest in 
their land, which increases agricultural productivity.228  A working 
registration system also allows for the formation of a land market.229  
Registration systems facilitate this process by removing obstacles to market 
formation such as procedural difficulties in transferring land, lack of 
necessary information, and unclear delimitation of individual and group 
rights, among others.230  Further, written documentation of contractual land 
rights leads to improved transparency, predictability, and reduces land-use 
disputes.231   
 
2. Additionally, the Chinese Government Must Issue Land Contracts and 
Certificates to All Farmers  
China has required written documentation of rural land rights 
contracts through regulations since 1997,232 and by law since the LAL was 
revised in 1998.233  Enhanced security of land-use rights through written 
contract has been demonstrated to increase the likelihood that farmers will 
invest in their land.  For instance, RDI's 2005 survey provides evidence that 
farmers who possess formal documentation of land-use rights are more 
likely to invest in their land than farmers who do not possess this 
documentation.234  Also, farmers who possess certificates or contracts that 
comply with the requirements of the RLCL are more likely to invest in their 
land than those who possess non-compliant contracts or certificates.235  
Increased investment rates will likely result in substantially higher 
production levels, 236 which will in turn increase rural incomes and help 
ensure grain security.  
The 2005 RDI study further shows that enforcement of this 
requirement has been lackluster.  Just forty-five percent of polled farmers 
had been issued a written land-use contract to their land.237  Certificates were 
issued about half the time (fifty-three percent).238  Approximately sixty-three 
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percent of farm households had been issued a contract, a certificate, or 
both.239  The majority of the contracts were issued during the three-year 
period after the enactment of the LAL in 1998, with the rate declining after 
2000.240   
Compliance with the substance of the RLCL is another issue.  After 
the RLCL was enacted in 2002, China did not experience a similar peak in 
the issuance of contracts and certificates.241  The content of contracts and 
certificates was set forth in that law.242  The contracts and certificates 
examined by RDI, troublingly, were compliant only 6.7% and 8.3% of the 
time, respectively.243  Without higher numbers achieved through effective 
implementation of the contracting laws already in place, creation of an 
effective registration system seems unlikely.  Likewise, if China institutes a 
registration system for agricultural land-use rights, such a system must not 
only enhance security of possession of legal land-use rights, but must also 
strengthen farmers’ ability to exercise those rights.  Therefore, the Chinese 
government must not only ensure that an effective registration system is in 
place, it must also educate farmers about those use rights.    
C. Rural Farmers Must Be Educated about Their Land-use Rights for the 
Three Changes to Have their Intended Effect 
In order to ensure the effectiveness of enhanced rural land-use rights, 
the CCP should also commit to better education about land-use rights for 
land contractors.  It should not just generally commit to supporting rural 
legal education, as it does in the 2008 Decision.244  Without a specific 
commitment to educate farmers about the changes to their use rights in the 
Policy Documents, farmers will likely stand defenseless against local 
officials who illegally readjust or convert the use of their contractual 
farmland.  Also, education about land-use rights is necessary to increase 
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farmers’ investments in their contractual land,245 and to potentially increase 
agricultural productivity.246   
The 2005 RDI study demonstrated that large percentages of Chinese 
farmers lacked valuable information about various aspects of the land-use 
rights system.247  For instance, 43.4% did not know that farmers may 
transfer or lease their contracted land (not including assignment of use 
rights) without the collective’s consent, and 49.3% of farmers did not know 
that when someone in their household dies, his or her contracted land need 
not be returned to the collective.248   
Admittedly, farmers might have become more educated about their 
land-use rights in the past four years, but even such a change would not 
demonstrate a firm commitment of the government and the CCP to educate 
farmers about the enhanced land-use rights in the Policy Documents.  The 
2008 Decision only makes a general commitment to “[s]trengthen 
information distribution and education about the legal system in the 
countryside . . . [and] increase farmers’ consciousness of the law,”249 not a 
specific commitment to educate farmers about the land-use rights listed in 
the Decision.  Thus, even if these improved rights are codified into law, it is 
unclear from the Decision’s statement to what extent the CCP plans to 
educate farmers about those rights.  
Granting farmers perpetual use rights and a more complete ability to 
trade their use rights will not benefit them if they lack knowledge of the 
content of the rights and how to exercise them in the first place.  A farmer 
who is unaware of his rights will not assert a claim against an official who 
violates them.  Education about land-use rights is also important because of 
the link between knowledge about rights and increases in farmers’ 
investment in their land,250 which in turn can potentially increase farmers’ 
production levels251 and incomes.252   
Finally, more rights education for farmers could potentially add to 
their use of the legal system to voice their grievances.  While the Chinese 
judiciary and the CCP are presumably not fond of an increase in litigation 
against local officials, litigation might help to curb the tendencies of local 
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officials to transfer land-use rights out of farmers’ hands for monetary 
gain.253  
In sum, the three changes in rural land-use rights have potential to 
achieve the CCP and government’s goals for the Chinese countryside, but 
will prove ineffective unless certain other measures accompany the changes.  
To ensure that farmers can strongly represent their interests as collective 
owners of rural agricultural land, Chinese law should clearly designate the 
natural village/villagers’ group as the single entity that exercises ownership 
rights to such land.  In addition, the CCP and the Chinese government 
should create a registration system for rural land that issues land contracts 
and certificates to all farmers in order to increase farmers’ tenure security 
and remove procedural obstacles to trading use rights on rural markets.  
Lastly, the CCP and government should take steps to thoroughly educate 
farmers about their land-use rights.  Doing so will ensure that more farmers 
assert their rights in the face of local officials who wish to ignore them, and 
will likewise promote investment in land and trade in use rights on rural 
markets. 
V. CONCLUSION 
With the issuance of the 2008 Decision and the 2009 No. 1 Document, 
the CCP and the Chinese government acknowledge that insecure land-use 
rights are a major problem facing Chinese farmers and indeed the whole of 
China today.  Based on the documents themselves, it is apparent that the 
CCP and the government are especially concerned about the growing rural-
urban income gap as well as maintaining grain security amidst the drive to 
convert agricultural land into construction land.  These are problems that the 
current legal structure governing rural land-use rights cannot adequately 
address.   
The Policy Documents propose remedies to these rural issues by 
making already existing land-use rights more meaningful.  According to the 
documents, this goal will specifically involve: (1) granting farmers indefinite 
terms for their contractual land-use rights; (2) creating markets for rural 
land-use rights by removing the current limitation on assignment of 
contractual terms; and (3) strongly restricting actions that decrease the total 
amount of agricultural land nationwide, including disciplinary action against 
local officials who fail to comply with the standards.   
These specific measures are good steps toward enhancing the 
meaningful land-use rights, and indirectly towards increasing farmers’ 
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incomes and maintaining grain security.  Halting the conversion of cultivated 
land to non-agricultural uses and granting farmers unlimited contractual 
terms will increase farmers’ confidence in their ability to obtain returns on 
investments in their land.  Increased investments in agricultural land will in 
turn boost production levels and help narrow the rural-urban income gap as 
well as strengthen grain security.  Facilitating a thriving market in land-use 
rights will also give farmers an enhanced sense of control over the use of 
their land.  It will likewise boost production by making it easier for farmers 
to form large-scale agricultural operations, thus contributing to increasing 
farmers’ incomes and maintaining grain supply.    
However, the Policy Documents leave several major problems 
unaddressed, or do not address them in adequate detail.  First, the 
Documents signal no intention to specify a particular rural organization as 
the holder of collective ownership, let alone an organization that could 
democratically represent farmers in decisions about the collectively owned 
land that they use.  Second, unlimited contractual terms and the ability to 
transfer land-use rights will prove useless without a fully functioning 
registration system for use rights, in which issuance of contracts, compliance 
of issued contracts with legal requirements, and recording of contracts are all 
ensured and enforced.  Lacking adequate documentation as well as a 
centrally-protected record of their land-use rights, farmers will continue to 
be unable to defend their interests in disputes over use rights or against local 
officials who violate their rights, let alone transfer their rights on a market.  
Finally, the CCP only mentions general measures to educate farmers about 
the legal system.  Unless the Chinese government commits to specifically 
educating farmers about their land-use rights, many of them will continue to 
be unable to defend their interests and confidently invest in their land, even 
if an adequate registration system is in place. 
In short, current Chinese policy regarding rural land-use rights does 
not represent a “breakthrough” in rural reform.  Farmers do not view 
government efforts as having many real effects on them, and for good 
reason; as it is currently structured, government policy adds little new 
changes to existing law, and it does not contain all of the necessary measures 
to strengthen land tenure security.  Providing farmers with temporary 
assurances and small reforms might pacify them into silence about their 
grievances, but in the long run, farmers will only respond to stronger 
measures that will truly empower them and improve their standard of living.  
Furthermore, the benefits of such measures will probably not be limited to 
Chinese farmers.  Rather, by increasing farmers’ spending capacity and 
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maintaining the grain supply, such measures will provide more stability to 
China as a whole.  In the words of the 2009 No. 1 Document,  
 
Completion of work [for] agriculture and the countryside in 
2009 has special and important meaning.  The greatest potential 
for expanding internal demand [exists] in the countryside; the 
foundation for realizing stable and relatively speedy economic 
development [lies] in agriculture; [and] farmers are both the key 
and the obstacle to guaranteeing and improving the livelihoods 
of the people.254 
 
                                           
254
 2009 No. 1 Document, supra note 12, introductory para. 4.  
